Reliability analysis has moved from the "back of the envelope" to the computer display terminal. Current reliability analysis tools differ not only in their solution techniques, but also in their approach to model abstraction. The analyst must be satisfied with the constraints that are intrinsic to any combination of solution technique and model abstraction. To get a better idea of the nature of these constraints, three reliability analysis tools (HARP, ASSIST/SURE, and CAME) were used to model portions of the Integrated Airframeflropulsion Control System Architecture.
INTRODUCTION
Reliability analysis has moved from the "back of the envelope" to the computer display terminal. This move was prompted, in part, by the use of complex digital systems in critical applications such as aircraft control, weapon systems, and communications. reliability analysis. In addition to the obvious increase in computational power, the computer can present the analyst with a high level abstraction of the problem. complements computational power by aiding the construction of larger models. analysis tools differ not only in their solution techniques, but also in their approach to model abstraction. Thus, when choosing a reliability analysis tool, these two factors must be considered. constraints that are intrinsic to any combination of solution technique and model abstraction.
The computer has a two-fold use in A high level abstraction
Current reliability
The analyst must be satisfied with the TO get a better idea of the nature of these constraints, three reliability analysis tools were used to model portions of the Integrated Airframeflropulsion Control System Architecture (IAPSA) [COHEN] . The IAPSA program is developing a computer system and validation methodology for an advanced fighter aircraft with an integrated control law. Advanced Information Processing System (AIPS) [LALA] building blocks concept. blocks are Fault Tolerant Processors (FTP) at simplex, duplex, triplex and quad redundancy and 1/0 mesh network components (nodes and links).
The IAPSA design is based on the
Available building
The reliability tools are the Hybrid Automated Reliability Prediction (HARP) program [BAWSO] , the Abstract Semi-Markov Specification Interface to the SURE Tool (ASSIST) with the Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator (SURE) [JOHNSON] [BUTLER], and the Computer Aided Markov Evaluator (CAME) [BABCOCK] . While the three tools all differ in their approach to model abstraction and solution technique, similarities can be found in the models that the tools use and the information that must be supplied by the user. For example, both CAME and HARP rely on the general rule that any component can fail at any time to drive the generation of the Markov failure model. This rule is coupled with user supplied 'death' conditions to terminate model growth. graph structure to supply both the list of components and death conditions. architectural graph of the system for the component list and a performance requirement graph for the death conditions. transition rules and death conditions. However, HARP uses a single fault tree CAME employs an ASSIST has explicit failure Next is a description of the information and techniques used to perform reliability analysis as generalized from the three tools. Three subsequent sections present details of ASSIST, HARP and CAME. The last section presents some conclusions that have been drawn during this exercise. Reliability Analysis Up Front example of another possible ordering would be if the system skipped the dual and proceeded directly to a simplex configuration from the triplex (4r311)-sparing, the ordering specifies which interface becomes activated upon failure of the current active interface.
Before one begins a reliability analysis he must have a good understanding of both the the system he is analyzing and the mathematical techniques which he will employ to do the analysis. Figure 1 shows a block diasram of the examDle oroblem. The FTP For the interfaces, which use warm has 4 channels (CP1. .4). a network interface (NI1) which is in turn connected to mesh network 1 (NET1). Channel 2 is connected to 2 network interfaces which are then connected to both mesh networks. Channel 3 is similar to channel 2. Channel 4 has 1 network interface attached to mesh network 2. For the purpose of this study the mesh networks are modeled as repairable components that have an inexhaustible number of spares.
Channel 1 is connected to Figure 2 contains an outline of information useful in describing a system and its failure processes. used later to describe the attributes of ASSIST, HARP and CAME.
The terminology introduced here will be A system (Airframe Network) is made up of components drawn from the classes of building blocks available (FTPs, Interfaces and Networks). The highest level functional requirement is that at least one working channel of a functioning FTP must be able to access one working network. configuration. minimum set of components required to meet a given level of performance. of performance is known as failure due to exhaustion, i.e., there were not enough components left to perform the task. than one level of performance and gracefully degrade from one level to the next. The probability of operating at each level during a mission is of interest.
Functional dependencies will exist between
Each component in a class is assigned a
The failure rate may be constant Most systems assume a constant failure A system will have at least one minimum This is best thought of as a A failure to meet this level A system may have more components. depends on the channel in which it is installed. Also, correct operation of the network depends on the interface to which it is connected.
Correct functioning of the interfaces
The redundancy level of the component class will be necessary, including whether the component is a hot (actively being used), warm (on-line, but not in use), or cold (off-line) spare. The "temperature" of the component may affect the failure rate (cold spares fail slower than warm spares) and the response to failures (only hot components should trigger critical recoveries). Also of interest is the order of reconfiguration. The FTP channels reconfigure from a quad to a triplex to a dual and finally to a simplex. 
Vulnerability is most directly determined by the voter. A majority voter will behave differently than a plurality voter and therefore will have a different vulnerability rule. Vulnerability is similar to, but should not be confused with, the minimum configuration. A system may experience several failures, and be vulnerable to a coverage failure during each failure, before the minimum configuration is reached. As an example, consider the quad FTP. FTP uses a majority voter. It is typical to assume that two simultaneous failures will defeat the FTP's voter. therefore, vulnerable to a critical simultaneous The FTP is, failure during the first and second failure/recovery events. failure that minimum configuration is a consideration.
It is not until the third
After a fault is detected, the system may recover. The fault is isolated to a component and the component is either removed or replaced. This recovery process can be described in several ways, the most common being a coverage parameter. coverage parameter divides arriving faults into two groups, those that cause system failure and those that do not. Using a coverage parameter can effectively remove the details of the fault handling process from the Markov model. This simplifies computation of the model a great deal. However, for a flight critical application, a coverage parameter might be on the order of 0.9999999, a difficult number to obtain experimentally.
The
An alternative approach is to model the recovery process as a rate which is competing with the critical failure transitions from a vulnerable state. Studies have shown that the recovery rate is not exponential. the use of Semi-mrkov models (i.e, Markov models with transitions that are not exponential). SURE Semi-Markov model, the recovery transition is expressed in terms of the mean and variance of the recovery time.
This led to the development of In the ASS1 ST/SURE SURE (Semi-Markov unreliabilitv Ranqe Evaluator) [BULTER] was developed to exploit White's theorem [WHITE] which allows recovery transitions to be expressed in terms of the means and variances of the recovery time distribution. This is significant for two reasons. First, the experimentally derived recovery time distributions (which are not exponential) can be described easily in terms of the mean and variance. Second, the theorem contains an algebraic expression for the solution of the model. This is more computationally efficient than other solution techniques for "stiff" models (i.e., models which contain transition times which are both much shorter and much larger than the mission time).
The SURE input language is similar to most Markov solvers. numbers. The direction of the transition is implied by their order. The transition rate follows. As expected, construction of large models is difficult. ASSIST (Abstract Semi-Markov Specification Interface to the SURE Tool) [JOHNSON] was developed to take advantage of symmetries which exists in the typical reliability analysis. ASSIST is a language with which an analyst with computer programming experience will feel comfortable. ~n ASSIST model consists largely of a set of rules which govern'the growth of transitions. A rule takes the form of an IF statement where the conditional phrase is in terms of state variables. When the condition is satisfied, the rule defines a state permutation function and transition rate. Because most failures can occur at any time and typically trigger the same recovery process, a few rules can specify a large model. If this symmetry did not exists, a rule would have to be written for a SURE run, the probability of being in the prune state can be compared to the total probability of failure to see if the model was trimmed prematurely (i.e., if the probability of entering the prune state is of the same order of magnitude as the probability of failure).
In SURE, pruning is triggered by a probability value. SURE solves the Markov model by unfolding paths and calculating the probability of being in the current state on that path. When an analyst requests a prune level, SURE stops expanding the path once the probability of occupying the current state falls below the requested prune level. SURE will print out the number of paths pruned and their total probability which is used for estimating the error caused by the pruning process.
Finally, because a loop in the model (such as caused by the repair of the networks) expands into an infinite path, SURE has a truncation level. The truncation level refers to the number of times a loop will be unfolded and defaults to 5. mission time, failure rates and recovery rates are defined.
ASSIST would then become more
In ASSIST, pruning can be triggered as a function
The model can then be pruned after,
It is common to introduce an
The pruned transitions After Figure 3 shows ASSIST input file. First, the Next, the SURE prune level is set at 1.OE-17. Figure 3 . ASSIST model description minimum configurations and vulnerability data. Two coverage conditions are the temporary exhaustion of the networks and failure of the FTP voter when the number of failed channels equals or outnumbers the unfailed channels. RW"beK that failed channels can be removed.
The ONEDEATH statement initiates death state aggregation. to prune at failure level 4.
The first set of transition rules governs the failure and repair of the networks. R" in the recovery transition denotes an exponential transition of rate R which SURE will translate to a mean, variance and exit probability. The exit probability is necessary when there are more than one competing recoveries (i.e., when more than one type of component is failed at the same time which is the case here). transitions contain the logic necessary to activate the appropriate network controller. seen, these rules create a loop in the Markov model and will trigger truncation at the fifth iteration.
The second series of transition rules apply to the failure of channels and interfaces. Embedded in this set of transition rules is the functional dependencies of the networks on the interfaces and the interfaces (and therefore networks) on the channels.
The final set of transition rules applies to channel recovery. When a channel fails, CP is decremented and the failed channels indicator, CPF, incremented. When the channel recovers. rPF i s decremented symbolizing the removal of the failed channel.
The PRUNEIF statement signals ASSIST
The term "FAST The network repair As can be
HARP

HARP (Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor)
[BAWSOJ is based on a technique referred to as behavioral decomposition. Due to the typically wide difference between failure rates and recovery rates, the recovery process analysis can be separated from the failure occurrence analysis. Coverage factors derived in the recovery process analysis are then combined with the failure occurrence analysis to create the complete model. The resulting model is smaller and easier to solve than a comparable ASSIST/SURE model. building, matrix construction and model solution. The model builder presents a familiar fault tree interface to the reliability analyst (although the markov model can be input directly). The analyst uses a fault tree to define the death conditions. The model builder creates what is termed the failure occurrence model (FORM) by failing each component in turn and testing the resulting state against the fault tree. only the information needed to compute the probability of failure due to exhaustion. placed in the model to indicate where recovery process coverage factors will be needed. Figure 4 shows the component dictionary for HARP. The three classes of components (FTP, INTERFACE, NE'IWDRK) are listed along with a symbol associated with the class failure rate. The numeric value of the failure rate will be added during the execution of the model. listed individually as would have been necessary if interfering component types were to be specified (interfering component types are explained in the following paragraph). added to the model by referencing an appropriate FEHM in the dictionary file. entries describing the recovery process's behavior with respect to four possible exits: repair, recovery, single point failure and near coincident failure (vulnerability failure). Here RECOVER.MOM refers to a moments FEHM (figure Sa) that contains the mean and variance for the channels' recovery transition.
HARP
will compute a coverage factor for the recovery transition based on these moments. Harp will automatically compute a coverage factor for a near coincident type failure. A second FEHM, REPA1R.MOI.I (figure 5b), describes the network repair transitions.
The components could have been
The recovery process is A FEHM contains
PROBABILITIES.AND.mS TRANSIENT RESTORATION EXIT:
EXIT PROBABILITY: .oOOOE+OO RECONFIGURATION COVERAGE EXIT: EXIT PROBABILITY: 1.000 FIRST MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: 1.000 SECOND MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: -3000 THIRD MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT:
SINGLE POINT FAILURE EXIT: EXIT PROBABILITY: .0000E+00 Figure 5a . HARP ReCOvery FEHM
PROBABILITIES.AND.MOMENTS
TRANSIENT RESTORATION EXIT: EXIT PROBABILITY: 1.000 FIRST MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: 1.000 SECOND MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: .3000 THIRD MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: .OOOoE+OO RECONFIGURATION COVERAGE EXIT: EXIT PROBABILITY: .ooooE+OO SINGLE POINT FAILURE EXIT: EXIT PROBABILITY: .ooooE+oO Figure 5b . HARP Repair FEHM
Interfering components can also be added to the dictionary file. functional dependencies. For example, if NI1 fails and it was controlling NETl, then the system is vulnerable during recovery to a failure of any component controlling NET2, initially CP4, NI6 and NET2. interfering status of the components is always active. The behavior of warm spares cannot be modeled. For example, if NI1 is controlling NETl, then a failure of N12, which is inactive at this time, will not trigger a recovery and thus not be vulnerable. to handle such "sequence dependencies". This description closely parallels the ASSIST DEATHIT clause with the exception that HARP automatically generates failure transitions that must be explicitly stated in ASSIST. construction is straightforward after the model is built. After the matrix is read by the model solver, the analyst is asked to supply values for the failure rates and mission times. This completes the input necessary for the failure due to exhaustion model.
Matrix
CAME
The CAME system (Computer Aided Markov Evaluator) [BABCOCK] executes in a Lisp environment and makes use of object oriented programming techniques to present the analyst the highest level abstraction of the reliability model of the three tools considered here. and the analysis proceeds through a series of windows where the analyst manipulates graphical objects and menus to achieve the desired results.
I I
The system description is entered 
CAME Object Descriptions
The data in the object templates come practically verbatim from the System Description in figure 2.
An additional class, CHANl, is added to aid in specifying dependencies as will be explained later. To define the recovery processes, the channels and interfaces are given Semi-Markov recovery transitions. The networks are described as repairable objects. Vulnerability is described by specifying the components which are critical during the recovery phase. This is similar to the interfering components of HARP and has the same potential drawback of not handling sequence dependencies. However, in CAME the analyst may also specify that the Semi-Markov transition (the recovery process) is only generated if that particular component is "in-use". This makes sense and allows some sequence dependencies to be expressed as will be shown in the Reconfiguration and Performance windows. Figure 9 shows the Performance Window. The performance level is used to define which components are needed to meet various levels of performance. CAME will return the probabilities of being at each performance level. functional" function is one of many special functions defined in CAME for performance level specification. Others are (failed x), (unfailed x), (functional x) and (path-from x y). Here, the system requirement that a path exist from one functional channel to one functional network is expressed. Performance level 1 is attained if both networks are accessible. Performance level 2 is reached if only 1 network is functioning. uses the Systems Architecture description to determine which components are needed to meet each performance level. In this m e r , CAME
The "at-least-n- . CAME Reconfigurations Window system with n components would then expand into 2" states. An exhaustive analysis of a system such as IAPSA would be intractable. Model simplification strategies are used to reduce the model's size and solution techniques employed to speed computation.
A solution was obtained using all three tools. In some cases the tool was modified, in others the d e l was changed. required talents beyond that of a system designer to correct the problem and continue the analysis.
In some cases the analyst might not have recognized that a problem existed without considerable experience with both the tool and the solution techniques associated with the tool. Although there is little doubt that some form of computer aided analysis is necessary, it is not expected that a completely general reliability analysis tool can be implemented. The analysis of a large system will require the talents of a system designer, a theoretician and a "tool guru" to tailor techniques appropriate for the job at hand.
In all cases the analyst
~ ~~~~~
The Reconfigurations Window is used to specify which processor is being used to control the network. strategy for processors associated with m l . In short, CPl is initially in control. Upon failure of CHANl, control is passed to either CP2 or C P~ depending on the availability of CHAN2. Remember that NI1 and CP1 are classed together in CHANl, and a dependency of CHANl on CP1 is established in the Further Specifications Window. The logic and dependencies expressed here describe the same process as the ASSIST transition statements of figure 3.
of information in all the windows is used to describe the subtle sequence dependency of the interface recovery process on channel control.
This completes the system description. To construct the model, the analyst invokes the Markov Modeler Window. The analyst can specify a truncation level (which is similar to ASSIST pruning) and several aggregation strategies which either work at the end of the model and aggregate death states and states with similar performance levels, or, which work within the model and are based on the total state vector. aggregation strategies, such as those which work within the model, increase model construction time, but may be worth it if many runs are to be made with the model. figure 11 is the reconfiguration It can now be seen that the combination The more complex
Shown in
Conclusion
After using ASSIST/SURE, HARP and CAME, it is clear that the theory and techniques embodied in these tools are mature. All three tools can be used to solve complex problems. presented with this example problem, all three tools failed to produce correct results. cases, either the tool or the model had to be modified. 
